

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

D. ATCH NO. 2998

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
(ATTN: Chief, SR)
FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

DATE: 9 January 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/ Operational

SPECIFIC— AEQUOR/ Transmittal of Letter Written
by Cambista 2 to []

1. Attached is the translation of a letter which was written by Cambista 2 and handed to [] for transmittal to []. The letter in brief outlines the relationship between Cambista 1 and the AIS during the last year and a half. It is a fairly concise estimate of Cambista 2's feelings, if not those of the organization which he represents, with regard to past and future potential collaboration between our two organizations.

2. In the latter part it deals with the absolute necessity of a meeting between Cambista 2 and []. This is regarded as a threat which may or may not be carried out. Formerly [] occasionally discussed policy matters with Cambista 2. However, as was to be expected, whenever a touchy policy matter came up, Cambista 2 wanted to deal with "the boss" instead of the case officer. Such a situation, of course, could not be tolerated since it places the case officer in the position of being merely a go-between without any plenipotentiary powers. With the gradual deterioration of Cambista 1/ AIS relationship as a result of our failure to provide a Cadre school, Cambista 2 became more and more insistent upon talking to []. The letter is being transmitted for the perusal and consideration of Headquarters.

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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CAMBISTA - 2

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Dear []

In connection with the new developments in the collaboration between the military circles in the [] and the American special section, I consider it my duty to report the following:

The basis for our contemporary collaboration was accepted by highly placed persons on your side and on mine in New York. It was accepted in connection with the general outlook in the Belorussian emigration, and primarily among the military, who left Belorussia during the last war. These military circles thought and continue to think that the Belorussian emigration can be of the greatest use in an eventual general struggle against bolshevism not at the front but in its own territory in the enemy's rear. This is why our side proposed the re-training of Belorussian military cadres, with the aim of military training for specific combat conditions, familiarization with new weapons, both American and Soviet, political training on the line of studying the democratic structure in the USA and the western democratic system in general, as well as study of the methods of bolshevik propaganda and methods of fighting it. In this way they would receive political "weapons", which may play an important part in a future war. For our part, we think that the training of our cadres, if only 100 men, and their placement in the enemy's rear would, in addition to the political aspect, yield military results, because these 100 men would mean, in a rather short time, 100 battalions and even regiments, depending on the organizational capabilities of the trained men and on the material support from abroad. Our proposals were approved by your side. It was found necessary to have some information from Belorussia at the present time, and also to have people there during the development of more extensive action. It was said on your side that 4 to 6 men would suffice for the latter.

It was in this form that I received an order from highly placed Belorussian circles. At my first meeting with you in Germany the basis for our collaboration, which did not fundamentally differ from the foundations worked out above, was discussed. You only let me know that 25 and not 100 men would be needed to start work. This conversation took place in March, 1951. For the Americans the greatest concern turned out to be the fate of the soldiers after training, if there were no immediate occasion to use them. We proposed that they be considered to be on an equal footing with American soldiers. If the political situation were such as to prevent their utilization and to obviate the possibility that they would be used in the next few years, there would be a general demobilization. If the question of utilizing them were one of months, or of one or two years, they could be used as a special section in the regular American army, ready for assignment to the proper organs of the []. At the next meeting, several months later, you said that the school could not be organized before March 1952. You said at the time that the matter of the school had already been decided definitely and in the affirmative, although the location of the school and its precise external form had not been determined. We can nonetheless be certain that the agreement will not be contravened. At that time I had no reason to lack confidence in the American representatives

and I therefore agreed to begin the training of men, so as not to lose time (those who were intended for immediate action). A survey of Belorussian youth was undertaken. For the most part those who came before the commission were possible candidates for immediate action, although some of those intended for the cadre school also came before the commission. The results, up to August, 1952, were that 5 men had been dispatched, which was more or less in accordance with our plans. However, the Americans did not fully carry out their obligations. They began to demand that only people who were willing to take part in immediate action come before the commission. The school was not organized by March. People began to ask me for concrete data regarding the beginning of school studies, so that they would know how to plan for the future. The Americans did not give me any concrete answers to my questions. In about June 1952, I asked me to organize a cadre school. The Americans agreed to finance it, but the direction, training, and responsibility would be exclusively in the hands of the Americans. Such a school was supposed to be completely under cover. Although such an outcome did not yield all of the conditions necessary for a cadre school, I agreed, in view of the fact that the Americans, for one reason or another, were not able to organize the planned school. Upon the request of the Americans, a school program was suggested, an organizational plan, a location, and a possible teaching staff, including an evaluation of the projected candidates for instructors. I was firmly assured that a decision had already been made to organize such a school. There remained only to determine the location of such a school. We arranged for the director of the school to come to Europe. He could not at first obtain a visa, but after a great deal of effort the question of the visa was settled. The person in question expended a lot of time and money and lost his job in connection with these efforts. He believed us, just as we believed the Americans, having no reason not to. The entire work was based on mutual trust. Other persons, who were being considered for teaching positions, were also informed of the fact. It is true that there were those among them who warned against being too trusting in our American coworkers, but I dispelled their doubts and convinced them that the Americans could not be interested in deceiving us. Candidates were told that studies would begin soon, and they arranged their lives accordingly. A budget was drawn up and the possibility was considered of camouflaging the school in some European country. Everything was prepared for the commencement of school work, only the Americans withheld final agreement. At first they said that they could not begin before they had spoken to the director, and when the director could come, they asked him not to take any action. Thus the beginning was endlessly drawn out. In the last month I formed the impression, following a conversation with one of your colleagues, that the Americans were in general doubt about the utility of such a school, to say nothing of beginning the work. With the best of intentions, I still could not understand such conduct. My request for a meeting with you was refused.

It must not be forgotten that we are dealing with people who have undergone a number of occupations, and who have been betrayed by a number of occupying powers. They are inclined to be distrustful. Among them are also people who have been betrayed by the Americans - immediately after the occupation of Germany. Continual procrastination elicits their distrust,

and sooner or later we will have to give them a definite answer and to explain our reasons. And I must warn you that time is not working in our favor; the people we want will either have settled down permanently to family life or they will have sought a way out with the help of other organizations resembling ours. As for me personally, I have no reason for thinking that the things we have agreed upon will ever be carried out. If the school is not organized, or even if a substitute for the school is found, we shall be compelled, in order not to lose confidence, to explain the actual reasons for the failure and to admit our naive confidence in the Americans was too great. The fact that we have refrained from doing this up to now is due to our realization that such a situation could lead to a rift between us and you and be harmful to efforts at future collaboration between us and earnest people.

The fact that I, who personally negotiated with you, am not able to meet with you to discuss the difficulties that are developing, is unprecedented in any sort of collaboration. It is quite possible that the new situation developed as a result of the frequent changes in liaison personnel, who look at matters that have been discussed with you earlier from a different angle. I find this fact very provoking, and it provides me with a basis for all sorts of conjectures. It may be that none of my requests for a meeting with you were transmitted; it is possible that some of the go-betweens, out of political considerations of their own, did not want to see such a serious matter come to fruition. I do not want to assume the most adverse possibility, namely communist infiltration and deliberate sabotage of an action so well begun. It is also hard to assume that a person such as you would have to hide from me. In order to clear up all of these matters, I must without question have a meeting with you. If I am met with a refusal, I shall have to find other ways to notify the proper American officials of the developing situation and to present them with the actual facts. I shall consider this my first duty, since a refusal to this request for a meeting would confirm my assumptions. I assure you that any steps I take or that will be undertaken in the near future stem from sincere desire for the best possible relations between us and for the most fruitful results possible in our work against the common foe, bolshevism.

I hope that the answer to this letter will decide the fate of our further collaboration. I would like to say again that my situation and that of my colleagues demands that we take a stand soon before people to whom concrete things have been promised.

Yours very truly,

Enclosed by [unclear] [unclear]

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